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This paper studies the transmission of shocks and the trade-offs between stabilizing CPI inflation and
alternative measures of the output gap in Ramses, the Riksbank's empirical dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of a small open economy. The main results are, first, that the transmission
of shocks depends substantially on the conduct of monetary policy, and second, that the trade-off between
stabilizing CPI inflation and the output gap strongly depends on which concept of potential output
in the output gap between output and potential output is used in the loss function. If potential output
is defined as a smooth trend this trade-off is much more pronounced compared to the case when potential
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01. Introduction
In this paper we examine how diﬀerent assumptions about the conduct of monetary policy aﬀect the
transmission of shocks in the economy. In addition, we also study the trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
CPI inﬂation and alternative deﬁnitions of the output gap. We compare the transmission of shocks
and variance trade-oﬀ under optimal monetary policy and under an estimated instrument rule using
Ramses, the main model used at Sveriges Riksbank for forecasting and policy analysis. Ramses
is a small open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model estimated with
Bayesian techniques and is described in Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (ALLV) [4] and [5].
By optimal monetary policy we mean policy that minimizes an intertemporal loss function under
commitment. We choose a quadratic loss function that corresponds to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
and is the weighted sum of three terms: the squared inﬂation gap between 4-quarter CPI inﬂation
and the inﬂation target, the squared output gap (measured as the deviation between output and
potential output), and the squared quarterly change in the Riksbank’s instrument rate, the repo
rate. We compare the optimal policy with policy following an estimated instrument rule, to get
an idea about how ineﬃcient the empirically estimated rule is compared with optimal policy and
about the policy preferences implied by the estimated rule.
The deﬁnition of potential output is important since this latent variable is used to compute the
output gap (the diﬀerence between output and potential output) in the loss function. A conventional
measure of potential output is a smooth trend, such as the result of a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter.
A second deﬁnition of potential output, promoted in the recent academic literature, is deﬁned as
the level of output that would prevail if prices and wages were ﬂexible, see for instance Woodford
[20] and Galí [12]. This latter measure of potential output is in line with the work of Kydland and
Prescott [14], since it incorporates eﬃcient ﬂuctuations of output due to technology shocks.
We ﬁrst examine to what extent alternative monetary policy aﬀects the transmission of various
shocks in the economy. According to the estimated model, shocks to total factor productivity
is a dominant driver of business cycles in Sweden (at least for policy under a simple instrument
rule), why these are particularly interesting to study. The estimated model assigns a dominant
role to productivity shocks in order to explain the fact that the correlation between GDP growth
and CPI inﬂation is about −0.5 for the years 1950—2007. Productivity shocks have also been
shown by ALLV [6] to play a key role for understanding the episode with low inﬂation and high
output growth in Sweden 2003—2006. We therefore examine how monetary policy may aﬀect the
1propagation of very persistent but stationary technology shocks. More speciﬁcally, we compare
the impulse-response functions conditional on optimal policy and conditional on the estimated
instrument rule. We ﬁnd that monetary policy has an important role in the transmission of the
technology shock into the economy. For instance, whether hours worked per capita rise or fall
persistently depend on the weight on inﬂation stabilization relative to output-gap stabilization
and interest-rate smoothing. Furthermore, the speciﬁcation of potential output in the output-gap
deﬁnition is important for the transmission of technology shocks. If potential output is deﬁned as
trend output, the output response after a technology shock will be substantially smaller than if
potential output is speciﬁed as the level of output under ﬂexible prices and wages.1 To illustrate the
eﬀects of a shock that creates a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output-gap stabilization regardless
of which output-gap deﬁnition is used in the loss function we therefore also study the impulse
responses to a labor supply shock.
We then examine the variance trade-oﬀ the central bank is facing under various speciﬁcations
of the loss function, comparing the diﬀerent output-gap deﬁnitions. Results for the estimated
instrument rule are also reported. The eﬃcient variance frontiers are computed with a given weight
on interest-rate smoothing. As a benchmark, we use a weight of 0.37 on the squared changes in
the nominal interest rate in the loss function.2 However, it turns out that the volatility of the
nominal interest rate in this case heavily violates the zero lower bound (ZLB) of the interest rate.
Therefore, we also follow the suggestion by Woodford [20] and Levine, Pearlman, and Yang [15]
a n di n v e s t i g a t et ow h a te x t e n tt h ee ﬃcient variance frontier is aﬀected by increasing the weight on
the squared interest rate in the loss function, in order to ensure a low probability of the nominal
interest rate falling below zero. We also quantify to what extent the estimated instrument rule can
be improved by optimizing the response coeﬃcients of simple instrument rule to minimize the loss
function. Finally, we examine how diﬀerent sets of shocks (technology, markup, preference, and
foreign shocks) aﬀect the variance trade-oﬀs faced by the central bank for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
the output gap in the loss function.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the stationary productivity shocks create a sharp trade-
oﬀ between stabilizing CPI inﬂation and stabilizing the output gap when trend output is computed
1 Potential output under ﬂexible prices/wages is deﬁned as the output level that would result if prices and
wages are completely ﬂexible but real distortions remain. We compare both unconditional and conditional potential
output. Conditional potential output is contingent upon the existing current predetermined variables, whereas
unconditional potential output is computed assuming the ﬂexible price equilibrium has lasted forever, thus making
use of a hypothetical level of the predetermined variables (see Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé and Svensson (ALLS) [2] for
a detailed discussion).
2 This number stems from estimating the model on Swedish data under the assumption that the Riksbank con-
ducted monetary policy according to the loss function with the trend output gap, see ALLS [2].
2with a smooth trend. Second, using an output gap in the loss function where potential output is
deﬁned as the level of output under ﬂexible prices and wages improves the policy trade-oﬀ, but
the trade-oﬀ still remains signiﬁcant, in particular for labor supply shocks (which are isomorphic
to wage markup shocks) and price markup shocks. Third, the estimated instrument rule is clearly
ineﬃcient relative to the optimal policy. Most of this ineﬀectiveness is driven by the fact that the
estimated policy rule responds very ineﬃciently to ﬂuctuations induced by foreign shocks. Fourth,
optimizing the coeﬃcients in the simple instrument rule closes about half the distance relative to
the optimal policy. Finally, imposing the ZLB constraint for the nominal interest rate shifts out the
variance frontiers somewhat, but the conclusions regarding the trend output gap and the ﬂexible
price-wage output gap are robust to introducing this constraint.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model and very brieﬂy discusses
the data and the estimation of the model. Section 3 discusses the impulse responses to a stationary
technology shock and a labor supply shock and their dependency on the policy assumption made.
Section 4 illustrates the variance trade-oﬀs the central bank is facing under diﬀerent output-gap
deﬁnitions. Finally, section 5 presents a summary and some conclusions. An appendix contains
some technical details. More technical details are reported in Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé and Svensson
(ALLS) [3].
2. Model and parameters
2.1. Model overview
This section gives an overview of the model economy. In appendix A the theoretical model is
described in greater detail.3
The model is an open-economy DSGE model similar to the one developed in ALLV [4] and
shares its basic closed economy features with many recent new Keynesian models, including the
benchmark models of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [9], Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Lindé [7], and Smets and Wouters [18].
The model economy consists of households, domestic-goods ﬁrms, importing consumption and
investment ﬁrms, exporting ﬁrms, a government, a central bank, and an exogenous foreign economy.
The households consume a basket consisting of domestically produced goods and imported goods,
which are supplied by domestic and importing ﬁrms, respectively. We allow the imported goods to
3 For a complete list of the log-linearized equations in the model we refer to ALLS [2].
3enter both aggregate consumption as well as aggregate investment. This is needed to match the
joint ﬂuctuations in both imports and consumption since imports (and investment) are much more
volatile than consumption.
Households can invest in their stock of capital, save in domestic bonds and/or foreign bonds,
and hold cash. The choice between domestic and foreign bonds results in an arbitrage condition
pinning down expected exchange-rate changes (that is, an uncovered interest parity condition).
Compared with a standard setting, the risk premium is allowed to be negatively correlated with
the expected change in the exchange rate, following the evidence discussed in for example Duarte
and Stockman [11]. As in the closed-economy model households rent capital to the domestic ﬁrms
and decide how much to invest in the capital stock given costs of adjusting the investment rate.
Wage stickiness is introduced through an indexation variant of the Calvo [8] model.
Domestic production is exposed to stochastic technology growth as in Altig, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Lindé [7]. The ﬁrms (domestic, importing and exporting) all produce diﬀerentiated
goods and set prices according to an indexation variant of the Calvo model. By including nominal
rigidities in the importing and exporting sectors we allow for short-run incomplete exchange rate
pass-through to both import and export prices.
The conduct of monetary policy is approximated with either a Taylor-type instrument rule or
optimal policy minimizing a loss function (see further details in section 2.2). When we estimate
the model, we allow for diﬀerent monetary policy conduct before and after the Swedish adoption
of an inﬂation targeting regime (see section 2.3 and appendix A).
The model adopts a small open-economy perspective where we assume that the foreign economy
is exogenous. The foreign inﬂation, output and interest rate are therefore given by an exogenous
VAR. In what follows we describe the behavior of the central bank.
2.2. Model solution and policy
After log-linearization, Ramses is a log-linear model with forward-looking variables. It can be
















Here, Xt is an nX-vector of predetermined variables in period t (where the period is a quarter);
xt is an nx-vector of forward-looking variables; it is an ni-vector of instruments (the forward-
4looking variables and the instruments are the nonpredetermined variables);4 εt is an nε-vector of
i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix Inε; A, B,a n dC,a n dH are matrices of the
appropriate dimension; and yt+τ|t denotes Etyt+τ for any variable yt, the rational expectation of
yt+τ conditional on information available in period t. The variables are measured as diﬀerences
from steady-state values, so their unconditional means are zero. The elements of the matrices A,
B, C,a n dH are estimated with Bayesian methods and considered ﬁxed and known for the policy
simulations. Hence the conditions for certainty equivalence are satisﬁed. The appendix of ALLS
[2] provides details on Ramses, including the elements of the vectors Xt, xt, it,a n dεt.
First we assume monetary policy can be described as minimizing an intertemporal loss function
under commitment. Let Yt be an nY -vector of target variables, measured as the diﬀerence from an
nY -vector Y ∗ of time invariant target levels. We assume that the target variables can be written as
















where D is an nY × (nX + nx + ni) matrix and partitioned conformably with Xt, xt,a n dit.L e t





where 0 <δ<1 is a discount factor, Lt is the period loss given by
Lt ≡ Y 0
tWYt, (2.4)
and W is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix.
We consider the following target variables: the model-consistent 4-quarter CPI inﬂation rate,
pc
t−pc
t−4,w h e r epc
t denotes the log of the CPI; a measure of the output gap, yt−¯ yt,w h e r eyt denotes
output and ¯ yt denotes potential output; and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the instrument rate, it − it−1,
where it denotes the Riksbank’s instrument rate, the repo rate. The period loss is
Lt =( pc
t − pc
t−4 − π∗)2 + λy(yt − ¯ yt)2 + λ∆i(it − it−1)2, (2.5)
where π∗ is the 2% inﬂation target and λy and λ∆i are nonnegative weights on output-gap sta-
bilization and instrument-rate smoothing, respectively. That is, the vector of target variables is
Yt ≡ (pc
t − pc
t−4 − π∗,y t − ¯ yt,i t − it−1)0 and the matrix W is the matrix with diagonal (1,λ y,λ ∆i)0.
4 A variable is predetermined if its one-period-ahead prediction error is an exogenous stochastic process (Klein [13]).
For (2.1), the one-period-ahead prediction error of the predetermined variables is the stochastic vector Cεt+1.
5We use 4-quarter inﬂation as a target variable rather than quarterly inﬂation, since the Riksbank
and other inﬂation-targeting central banks normally specify their inﬂation target as a 12-month
rate. Furthermore, the inﬂation target variable is assumed to be model-consistent CPI inﬂation
since this measure more accurately captures the true import content in the consumption basket.5
Under the assumption of optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective, the optimal


























for t ≥ 0,w h e r eX0 and Ξ−1 are given. The Klein algorithm returns the matrices F and M.T h e s e
matrices depend on A, B, H, D, W,a n dδ, but they are independent of C. The independence of
C demonstrates the certainty equivalence of the optimal policy and equilibrium. The nX-vector Ξt
consists of the Lagrange multipliers of the lower block of (2.1), the block determining the forward-
looking variables. The initial value Ξ−1 for t =0is given by the optimization for t = −1 (or equal
to zero in the case of commitment from scratch in t =0 ). The choice and calculation of the initial
Ξ−1 is further discussed in ALLS [2].
We compare results from three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the output gap (yt−¯ yt)i nt h el o s s
function. The ﬁrst deﬁnition, the trend output gap uses the trend production level as potential
output (¯ yt), which is growing stochastically due to the unit-root stochastic technology shock in
the model. This deﬁnition of potential output will resemble a potential output computed with an
HP ﬁlter.6 The second deﬁnition, the unconditional output gap, speciﬁes potential output as the
hypothetical output level that would arise if prices and wages were completely ﬂexible and had
been so for a very long time. Unconditional potential output therefore presumes diﬀerent levels
of the predetermined variables, including the capital stock, from those in the actual economy. In
contrast, the third deﬁnition, the conditional output gap, makes potential output contingent upon
the existing current predetermined variables. Conditional potential output is thus deﬁned as the





















where ωc is the share of expenditures in the CPI spent on imported goods, p
d
t the (log) domestic price level and
p
m,c
t the (log) price of imported goods that the consumer hast op a y . T h ew e i g h t su s e dt oc a l c u l a t et h em o d e l -





the import share in consumption. This deﬁnition of CPI inﬂation is consequently consistent with the notion that due
to distribution costs etc., the import share of consumption is somewhat exaggerated in the oﬃcial statistics.
6 The correlation between the trend output gap and an output gap computed with the HP-ﬁlter is about 0.65
using 5000 observations of simulated data from the model.
6hypothetical output level that would arise if prices and wages suddenly become ﬂexible in the
current period and are expected to remain ﬂexible in the future.7
We deﬁne the ﬂexprice equilibrium under the assumption that prices and wages are completely
ﬂexible in the domestic economy (thus keeping the foreign economy distorted), and determine the
nominal variables by assuming that CPI inﬂation is kept constant at its steady-state level (ˆ πc
t =0 ).
When computing the two cases of ﬂexprice potential output we also disregard markup shocks and
ﬁscal shocks, and set these to zero in the ﬂexprice economy.
Lastly, as a comparison to the optimal policy under equation (2.5), we also include the estimated
instrument rule in the subsequent analysis. In this case monetary policy is approximated with a
generalized Taylor-type instrument rule, following Smets and Wouters [18]. The central bank is
assumed to adjust the short term interest rate in response to deviations of CPI inﬂation from a
time-varying inﬂation target, the output gap (measured as actual minus trend output), the real
exchange rate and the interest rate set in the previous period. The instrument rule (expressed in
log-linearized terms) follows:
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where it denotes the Riksbank’s repo rate, ∆ denotes the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, ¯ πc
t denotes a
time-varying inﬂation target, b ˜ xt ≡ ˆ St+ ˆ P∗
t − ˆ Pc
t denotes the real exchange rate (log-deviations from
steady-state are denoted by a hat), St denotes the nominal exchange rate, P∗
t denotes the foreign
price level, and εRt is an uncorrelated monetary-policy shock.
2.3. Parameters
The model’s parameters are estimated using Bayesian techniques on 15 Swedish macroeconomic
variables during the period 1980Q1—2007Q3. We refer the reader to ALLS [2] for a detailed de-
scription of the estimation. To make the paper self-contained we report in appendix B the values
for the calibrated parameters (table B.1) and the obtained estimation results (table B.2). In the
subsequent analysis the estimated posterior mode values under the estimated instrument rule are
used for all the non-policy parameters. The estimates of the model parameters seem invariant with
respect to alternative assumptions about monetary policy during the sample we use to estimate
7 For a detailed description on how to calculate the unconditional and conditional potential output, see appendix
C in ALLS [2].
7the model, so we treat them as structural and independent of the monetary policy.8
3. Monetary policy and the transmission of shocks
Under optimal policy, the central bank responds to all relevant predetermined variables and shocks
to the economy. With a simple instrument rule, the central bank only responds to some variables
of the economy. To understand how monetary policy aﬀects the dynamics of the model, we ﬁrst
look at the impulse response functions to a stationary technology shock under optimal policy and
under policy with the estimated instrument rule, since total factor productivity is a key driver of
business cycles in according to the estimated model.
Figure 3.1 depicts the impulse responses to a positive stationary technology shock (one standard
deviation) for optimal policy and for policy with the estimated instrument rule. The impulse occurs
in quarter 0. Before quarter 0, the economy is in the steady state with Xt =0and Ξt−1 =0for
t ≤ 0 and xt =0and it =0for t ≤− 1. Under optimal policy, we use the estimated loss function
(λy =1 .10, λ∆i =0 .37) with the trend output gap (where the output gap between output and
trend production is used), the unconditional output gap (the gap between output and unconditional
ﬂexprice potential output), and the conditional output gap (the gap between output and conditional
ﬂexprice potential output) and plot the corresponding impulse responses. It should be noted that
this technology shock does not aﬀect trend output in the model (which is inﬂuenced only by the
unit-root technology shock). The output level under ﬂexible prices and wages, ﬂexprice potential
o u t p u t ,i so fc o u r s ea ﬀected by the shock.
We start by comparing the impulse responses under policies using the trend output gap either
a sar e s p o n s ev a r i a b l e( i n s t r u m e n tr u l e )o ra sat a r g et variable in the loss function (optimal policy).
Even if the instrument-rule parameters and the loss-function parameters are both estimated to
capture the historical behavior of the central bank, the responses to a stationary technology shock
are quite diﬀerent when following the instrument rule (dashed curves) or using the quadratic loss
function (dashed-dotted curves). The ﬁgure shows that optimal policy stabilizes inﬂation and the
output gap more eﬀectively over time than the instrument rule, although optimal policy initially
allows a larger fall of both CPI and domestic inﬂation when using the trend output gap in its loss
function. The nominal interest-rate response under the instrument rule is much more persistent
8 In particular, in ALLS [2] we estimate the model under two assumptions regarding the conduct of monetary
policy during the inﬂation targeting period (1993-). First, we approximate monetary policy with the simple Taylor-
type rule (2.9), and second we approximate it with loss function of the type (2.5). In both cases, we obtain very
similar parameter estimates.
8Figure 3.1: Impulse response functions to a (one-standard deviation) stationary technology shock






























































































Conditional Unconditional Trend Instrument rule
than under optimal policy (which is even of the opposite sign), but inﬂation can still not be brought
back to target as quickly. The real interest-rate response (level as well as the gap between the real
interest rate and the state-dependent neutral real interest rate) is almost twice as high under
optimal policy compared with the instrument rule and therefore reduces the increase in the trend
output gap relative to the instrument rule. The stationary technology shock creates a trade-oﬀ for
the central bank between balancing the induced decline in inﬂation and the higher (trend) output
gap, and since the shock process is very persistent (ρε =0 .966) this trade-oﬀ will last for many
quarters. Under optimal policy such a trade-oﬀ is very costly in terms of the loss function, so the
central bank invokes a forceful response to the technology shock. In contrast, the instrument rule
9cannot respond in an optimal fashion for each shock separately, but captures a realistic response
b a s e do ni n ﬂation and the trend output gap derived from the historical behavior of the central
bank. Had the central bank used larger (lower) coeﬃcients on the inﬂation (trend output gap)
variables in the instrument rule relative to the empirical estimates, inﬂation would approach target
much faster after a shock to technology also under the instrument rule.
Figure 3.1 also illustrates the diﬀerences because of alternative output-gap measures in the cen-
tral bank’s loss function. The solid and dotted curves show the impulse responses under optimal
policy when potential output is speciﬁed as the output level prevailing under completely ﬂexible
prices and wages, where the ﬂexprice equilibrium has lasted forever (unconditional ﬂexprice poten-
tial output, dotted) or where prices and wages become ﬂexible in the current period (conditional
ﬂexprice potential output, solid). The dashed-dotted curves, on the other hand, show the impulses
when the central bank stabilizes deviations of output from trend potential output. Due to sticky
prices and wages, the stationary technology shock aﬀects (unconditional/conditional) potential out-
put quicker than actual output, and the ﬂexprice output gap is therefore initially negative, whereas
the trend output gap is positive (since trend output is by deﬁnition not aﬀected by the shock).
This important diﬀerence between the two output-gap deﬁnitions implies that the interest rate
responses diﬀer. The real interest rate response is negative when the central bank stabilizes the
ﬂexprice output gap and positive when it stabilizes the trend output gap. When the central bank
stabilizes the ﬂexprice output gap, it does not face the unfavorable trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and the trend output gap. Therefore, the policy response can almost solely be directed
at keeping inﬂation at target. This in eﬀect implies that inﬂation can be stabilized much quicker
than for the trend output gap, even though the weights in the loss function are the same in the two
cases.
Another result from ﬁgure 3.1 is that the impulse responses of conditional and unconditional
potential output diﬀer. This is so because conditional potential output depends on the existing
level of the predetermined variables in the actual economy with sticky prices and wages whereas
unconditional potential output depends on the hypothetical level of the predetermined variables
of the hypothetical economy with ﬂexible prices and wages. When the shock hits the economy in
quarter 0, the two output-gap deﬁnitions will be equal (since the economy by assumption starts out
in steady state in quarter −1, which is the same for both the actual economy and the hypothetical
ﬂexprice economy), but in quarter 1 they will diverge. This is because conditional potential output
in period 1 depends on the actual level of the predetermined variables in quarter 1 in the economy
10with sticky prices and wages whereas unconditional potential output in quarter 1 depends on the
hypothetical level of the predetermined variables in quarter if prices and wages had been ﬂexible
(see appendix C in ALLS [2] for further details). The predetermined variables in quarter 1 in the
sticky-price economy will diﬀer from those in the ﬂexprice economy because the forward-looking
variables and the instrument rate in quarter 0 will diﬀer between the sticky-price and the ﬂexprice
economy. Even if no new innovations have occurred between quarter 0 and quarter t, the levels
of the predetermined variables used for computing the two potential output levels will thus diﬀer.
Since actual output and conditional potential output share the same predetermined variables in
each period, the conditional output gap will normally be smaller than the the unconditional output
gap. Moreover, with diﬀerent output gaps in the loss function, the optimal policy responses will
normally be diﬀerent.
In ﬁgure 3.2 we show how sensitive the impulse responses to a stationary technology shock
are to changes in the weight on output stabilization and interest-rate smoothing when using the
unconditional output gap in the loss function. The solid curve (a) reiterates the optimal responses
under the estimated loss function (λy =1 .10, λ∆i =0 .37) ,w h i c hi sc o m p a r e dw i t h( b )s t r i c t
CPI inﬂation targeting (λy =0 , λ∆i =0 .01, dotted), (c) more output stabilization (λy =5 ,
λ∆i =0 .37, dashed-dotted), and (d) more interest-rate smoothing and less output stabilization
(λy =0 , λ∆i =2 .0, dashed).
For strict inﬂation targeting, (b), the central bank stabilize inﬂation after the technology shock
almost completely, but with high variability in the real variables and the nominal interest rate.
For some weight on interest-rate smoothing, (d), the nominal interest rate response is substantially
moderated, at the cost of more inﬂation variability. Finally, for a higher weight on stabilizing the
output gap, (c), the output gap response is moderated relative to the other cases.
To illustrate the eﬀects of a shock that creates a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output-gap
stabilization irrespective of which deﬁnition of output gap is used in the loss function, ﬁgure 3.3
shows the impulse responses to a negative (one standard deviation) labor supply shock. In the
theoretical model, this shock is up to a scaling factor observationally equivalent to a (positive) wage
markup shock. This shock induces a negative output gap both measured as deviation from trend
potential output as well as from (conditional and unconditional) ﬂexprice potential output. Trend
potential output is not at all aﬀected by the stationary wage markup shock, whereas (conditional
and unconditional) ﬂexprice potential output is. Because of wage and price stickiness, actual
output is not directly adjusted to the disturbance. The higher real wage (not shown) pushes down
11Figure 3.2: Impulse response functions to a (one-standard deviation) stationary technology shock



















































































































hours worked (not shown) and thereby both potential and actual output. However, under ﬂexible
wages, the real wage and hours worked adjusts very quickly to the new state, which feeds into
unconditional ﬂexprice potential output and generates a negative output gap. The eﬀects on the
real wage, ﬂexprice potential output and actual output are more short-lived compared with the
technology shock, since the persistence of the labor supply shock is much lower (ρςh =0 .38).
However, as seen from the unconditional output gap (which is not closed as quickly), the dynamic
diﬀerences under the labor supply shock are larger compared with the technology shock. We also see
that after a labor supply shock, the instrument rule is about as good as optimal policy, either with
trend or unconditional output gap in the loss function, in bringing inﬂation back to target. With
12Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions to a (one-standard deviation) labor supply shock under




































































































Conditional Unconditional Trend Instrument rule
the conditional output gap in the loss function, it appears that inﬂation is stabilized more for the
given weights in the loss function. Since conditional ﬂexprice potential output is contingent upon
the current state variables it resembles actual output more than unconditional ﬂexprice potential
output (cf. the solid curves), implying a somewhat smaller output gap and thereby more scope for
inﬂation stabilization when the weights in the loss function are identical.
4. Variance trade-oﬀs for the central bank
In this section, we examine the trade-oﬀs the central bank is facing under optimal policy and under
a simple instrument rule. As shown in Rudebusch and Svensson [16], when the intertemporal
13loss function (2.3) is scaled by 1 − δ, the expected (conditional) intertemporal loss becomes equal
to the unconditional mean of the period loss function when the discount factor approaches unity
(limδ→1 Et
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+ λyVar[yt − ¯ yt]+λ∆iVar[it − it−1] (4.1)
under the assumption that the unconditional mean of 4-quarter CPI inﬂation equals the inﬂation
target (E[pc
t−pc
t−4]=π∗) and the unconditional mean of the output gap equals zero (E[yt−¯ yt]=0 ).
Under these assumptions, optimal policy for diﬀerent loss-function weights λy and λ∆i results
in eﬃcient combinations of (unconditional) variances of inﬂation, the output gap, and the ﬁrst-
diﬀerence of the nominal interest rate. These variances for diﬀerent loss-function weights provide
the eﬃcient relevant policy trade-oﬀs between stabilization of inﬂation and the output gap and
interest-rate smoothing. Appendix C shows how the unconditional variances are computed. To
investigate the role of alternative measures of the output gap in the loss function, we show the
variance trade-oﬀs for either the trend output gap or the unconditional output gap in the loss
function. We ﬁrst study the variance trade-oﬀs when all shocks are active (ﬁgure 4.1), and then
move on to an analysis of which type of shock inﬂuences the trade-oﬀsm o s t( ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3).9
The curves referring to ZLB concern the case when the zero-lower-bound restriction on the nominal
interest rate is imposed. They will be discussed in section 4.1.
In ﬁgure 4.1, the second row of the left column shows the variance of the trend output gap
plotted against the variance of inﬂation, where inﬂation is 4-quarter CPI-inﬂation. The curve is
obtained when varying the weight on output stabilization (λy) in the loss function with the trend
output gap, given a ﬁxed weight on interest-rate smoothing (λ∆i =0 .37). The third row of the left
column shows the corresponding variance of the nominal interest rate plotted against the variance
of inﬂation, and the fourth row of the same column shows the variance of the real exchange rate
plotted against the variance of inﬂation. Each λy results in a particular variance of inﬂation, and
the ﬁgure should thus be read as if a vertical line through that level of inﬂation variance connects
the three subplots. The curves are plotted for λy between 0.0001 and 10. A circle denotes the
combination of variances resulting from λy =1 . On the solid curve only, the extreme low and
high values for λy are marked by a square and diamond, respectively. The right column shows
the variances when the unconditional output gap is used in the loss function instead of the trend
output gap.
9 In order not to lengthen the paper we have in this section chosen to only look at the unconditional output gap
and not the conditional output gap.
14Figure 4.1: Variance trade-oﬀs when using either the trend or unconditional output gap in loss
function and optimized simple instrument rule.
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In the ﬁgure, we compare the variance trade-oﬀs under optimal policy (solid curve) with the
variance obtained under the estimated instrument rule (+) and an optimized simple instrument
rule (dashed curve). The optimized simple instrument rule has the following form,





+ ρy(yt − yt)], (4.2)
where the response coeﬃcients ρR, ρπ,a n dρy are chosen to minimize the unconditional mean of
the central bank loss function (4.1) for each given λy.10 We use the same output gap (trend or
unconditional) in the simple instrument rule (4.2) and the unconditional mean of the loss function
10 We use Matlab’s optimizers ‘fminunc’ and ‘fminsearch’ repeatedly to ﬁnd the global optimum for the diﬀerent
response coeﬃcients.
15(4.1). The resulting optimized response coeﬃcients in the simple instrument rule (4.2) are reported
in table 4.1. We include forward-looking variables dated in period t in the simple instrument rule
above, which means that the instrument rule not only depends on predetermined variables and is
hence an implicit rather than explicit instrument rule. Consequently, since the interest rate then
depends on forward-looking variables which in turn depend on the interest rate, the instrument
rule is an equilibrium relation rather than an operational realistic instrument rule. We include
forward-looking variables in thes i m p l ei n s t r u m e n tr u l ea saw a yt oa l l o wt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea l s oi n
this case to respond to some current shocks and hence to be less at a disadvantage compared with
the optimal policy.
Table 4.1: Optimized simple instrument rule
it = ρRit−1 + ρπ(πt − π∗)+ρy(yt − yt)
Trend output gap Unconditional output gap
λy ρR ρπ ρy Loss ρR ρπ ρy Loss
0.0001 1.03 0.51 0.003 1.97 1.01 0.51 −0.004 1.98
0.01 1.03 0.51 0.004 2.16 1.01 0.50 −0.003 2.09
0.11 1.02 0.47 0.01 4.07 1.01 0.47 0.004 3.17
0.21 1.01 0.44 0.02 5.88 1.01 0.44 0.01 4.19
0.31 1.01 0.42 0.02 7.59 1.02 0.41 0.02 5.15
0.41 1.01 0.39 0.02 9.21 1.02 0.39 0.02 6.05
0.51 1.02 0.36 0.03 10.73 1.02 0.37 0.03 6.90
1 1.05 0.25 0.05 16.84 1.03 0.32 0.06 10.38
1.5 1.07 0.19 0.07 21.19 1.00 0.32 0.13 12.90
2 1.09 0.17 0.09 24.31 0.96 0.32 0.21 14.60
3 1.10 0.16 0.14 28.51 0.90 0.25 0.33 16.91
4 1.12 0.16 0.20 31.24 0.90 0.24 0.40 18.74
5 1.13 0.17 0.27 33.20 0.91 0.25 0.45 20.46
6 1.13 0.17 0.34 34.72 0.92 0.26 0.49 22.10
7 1.13 0.17 0.40 35.95 0.93 0.27 0.54 23.68
8 1.13 0.17 0.47 36.98 0.93 0.29 0.58 25.20
9 1.12 0.17 0.53 37.87 0.93 0.30 0.62 26.69
10 1.12 0.17 0.59 38.66 0.93 0.31 0.65 28.14
Table 4.1 shows that the optimized coeﬃcients of the instrument rule are such that the optimized
simple instrument rules are generally “super-inertial,” that is, ρR is above unity. The exception is
that ρR is lower than unity for the unconditional output gap when λy is suﬃciently high (roughly
above 1). Another property is that the response coeﬃcients on the inﬂation (output gap) decreases
(increases) as the weight on output-gap stabilization is increased. This property is not obvious
and not general, since the mapping from loss function weights to optimal instrument-rule response
coeﬃcients is complicated and model-dependent.
16The top row in ﬁgure 4.1 shows the relative loss for the diﬀerent polices, expressed as the
ratio between the unconditional mean loss under the optimal policy and the unconditional mean
loss under the non-optimal policies, plotted for each λy against the inﬂation variance of the non-
optimal policy. Thus, the relative loss is bounded between zero and unity and shows what fraction
of the loss for the non-optimal policy the loss for the optimal policy is. The dashed curve shows the
relative loss under the optimized simple instrument rule. The vertical line marked with + shows
the relative loss for the estimated instrument rule. The latter is plotted for diﬀerent λy against the
constant inﬂation variance for the estimated instrument rule.
In the ﬁgure, we see that the central bank can improve on the estimated instrument rule by
conducting optimal policy, since the loss under optimal policy is less than 0.5 of the loss under
the estimated instrument rule. Optimizing the response coeﬃcients of the simple instrument rule,
however, closes a substantial part of the gap between the estimated instrument rule and the optimal
policy, but the relative loss for the optimized simple instrument rule is still only about 0.75, and
inﬂation and output-gap variances are thus still ineﬃcient and can be further reduced by optimal
policy. Interestingly, the nominal interest rate variance is larger under optimal policy than under
the estimated instrument rule, which contributes to the more favorable inﬂation output trade-oﬀ
relative to the estimated instrument rule. Figure 4.1 also shows that the central bank appears to
face a relatively sharp trade-oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. If the central bank
wants to decrease the variance of inﬂation from 20 to 1, then it has to accept an increase in the
variance of output of about 20, that is, the variance frontier has an “average” slope of about −1.11
As can be seen from the right column of the second row in ﬁgure 4.1, the slope of the trade-oﬀ is
about the same if the unconditional output gap is used in the loss function instead of the trend
output gap. However, we see that the variance trade-oﬀ is more favorable and the variance curve
is closer to origin for the unconditional output gap compared with that for the trend output gap.
Thus, it is easier to stabilize the unconditional output gap than the trend output gap. Finally,
the bottom row shows that lower output gap variance and higher inﬂation variance go with higher
variance of the real exchange rate, so the real exchange rate is apparently implicitly adjusted to
stabilize the output gap.
To examine which diﬀerent shocks create the trade-oﬀsi nﬁgure 4.1, ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the
variance trade-oﬀs between inﬂation and the output gap for diﬀerent subsets of active shocks, as well
as the corresponding variances of the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate plotted against
11 We measure both inﬂation and the output gap in per cent, which implies that the variance is deﬁned in terms
of squared %.
17each λy. W eh a v ed i v i d e dt h es h o c k si n t of o u rd i ﬀerent categories: domestic technology shocks
(that is, stationary technology and investment speciﬁc technology shocks), markup shocks (that
is, domestic, imported consumption, imported investment and export markup shocks), preference
shocks (that is, consumption preference and labor supply shocks), and foreign shocks (that is,
unit-root technology, asymmetric technology, ri s kp r e m i u ma n df o r e i g nV A Rs h o c k s ,w h i c ha r e
foreign inﬂation, output and interest rate shocks). It is important to notice that the parameters
in the optimized simple instrument rule are optimized on the full set of shocks, not on each subset
separately. Therefore, it is possible that the variance trade-oﬀs between inﬂation and the output
gap are not always downward sloping for a particular subset of shocks for the optimized simple
instrument rule (but they are always downward sloping for the optimal policy, which responds
optimally to each shock separately (see (2.7) and (2.8)).
Figure 4.2 refers to the case with the trend output gap in the loss function and the variance of
the trend output gap. It shows that, in that case, the variance trade-oﬀs between inﬂation and the
trend output gap is predominantly driven by the domestic technology shocks. The reason is that the
stationary technology shock aﬀects actual output but not trend output. Even if the shock is eﬃcient
in the sense that it lowers inﬂation pressure and increases actual output, trend productivity is not
aﬀected and the output gap therefore increases and thus creates a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and the trend output gap. We also see from the ﬁgure that the central bank needs to
balance inﬂation stabilization against output-gap stabilization for most of the diﬀerent sets of
shocks, as the variance frontiers are downward sloping for all subsets of shocks. This is partly due
to the interest-rate smoothing term in the loss function and partly due to the open-economy aspects
of the model. Since all variations in the interest rate also lead to ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate,
it matters for policy how, for example, the consumers substitute between domestic and imported
goods. The third column of the ﬁgure shows that the variance of the real exchange rate is high for
all the diﬀerent categories of shocks (cost-push shocks asw e l la sd e m a n d - o r i e n t ed shocks). Finally,
we see that the variances for the estimated instrument rule is rather close to the variance tradeoﬀ
for the optimal policy for all the categories of shocks except the foreign shocks, for which the
estimated instrument rule is found to be very ineﬃcient.
Figure 4.3 refers to the case with the unconditional output gap in the loss function and the
variance of the unconditional output gap. In this case, the variance trade-oﬀ is mainly caused by
preference shocks rather than domestic technology shocks. Since productivity shocks inﬂuence both
unconditional potential output and actual output, the unconditional output gap will be less aﬀected
18by this type of shock compared with the trend output gap. This means that the central bank does
not have to trade oﬀ inﬂation stability for output-gap stability to the same extent when using
the unconditional output gap in the loss function. It should also be noted that the unconditional
output gap is negatively aﬀected whereas the trend output gap is positively aﬀected by an increase
in productivity (see ﬁgure 3.1), which implies that a lower interest rate stabilizes inﬂation and the
ﬂexprice output gap simultaneously. The labor supply shock and the consumption preference shock,
on the other hand, aﬀect inﬂation and the output gap with opposite signs irrespective of which
output gap deﬁnition is used in the loss function. In ﬁgure 3.3 we saw that the central bank cannot
simultaneously stabilize both the increase in inﬂation and the negative (unconditional, conditional,
and trend) output gap in response to labor supply (wage markup) shocks. So this shock, along
with the price markup shocks are the main sources of the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the
unconditional output gap.
4.1. The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
As is evident in ﬁgure 4.1, the interest-rate variance is relatively high under both the optimized
instrument rule and the optimal policy. This means that the zero lower bound (ZLB) for the
nominal interest rate may occasionally bind when shocks hit the economy. An approximation to
the (non-linear) constraint that the nominal interest rate must be non-negative is to limit the
variance of the nominal interest rate and thereby reduce the probability that the interest rate
violates the ZLB. This approximation allows us to keep the linear-quadratic approach and focus
on the second moments, but a potential drawback is of course that the approximation also limits
upward movements in the nominal interest rate. We nevertheless adopt this approximation (see
Woodford [20] for a discussion).12
When optimizing the response coeﬃcients of the simple instrument rule we therefore add the
restriction there is only a 1% probability of hitting the ZLB. With an assumed steady state value
for the nominal interest rate of 4.25% this implies that the variance of of the nominal interest rate
is not allowed to be larger than 3.34%. The dashed-dotted curves in ﬁgure 4.1 show the outcome of
this procedure. Limiting the variance in the nominal interest rate implies the central bank can not
stabilize output and inﬂation to the same extent, and the variance frontier moves slightly further
out compared with when the ZLB is not imposed. For small λy the diﬀerence is not particularly
12 In a smaller model it would be possible to deal with the consequences of the zero lower bound in a more rigorous
fashion, for example along the lines of Adam and Billi [1].
19Figure 4.2: Variance trade-oﬀs between when diﬀerent shocks are active. Trend output gap in the
loss function.
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pronounced, but for large λy the ZLB restriction results in a much larger output-gap variance that
is not compensated by the decrease in inﬂation variance and hence the loss increases substantially.
A larger output variability also feeds into a somewhat higher variance of the real exchange rate
when the trend output gap is considered. It should, however, also be noted that the restriction
on the variance of the nominal interest rate is strongly binding. For large weights on output-gap
stabilization, the interest rate variance is almost six (nine) times as high when the ZLB is not
imposed in the trend (unconditional) output-gap case. From this perspective, the impact on the
inﬂation-output variance trade-oﬀ seems rather modest.
We also impose the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate on the optimal policy, in
20Figure 4.3: Variance trade-oﬀsw h e nd i ﬀerent subsets of shocks are active. Unconditional output
gap in loss function.
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this case by adding an extra interest-rate variance argument, λiit
2, to the loss function in (2.5)
and gradually increasing λi until the variance of the nominal interest rate is not larger than 3.34%.
The resulting variance trade-oﬀs are depicted as dotted curves in ﬁgure 4.1. We see that the
trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output-gap variance shifts out a bit but not much. So even if the
interest-rate variance in the unrestricted case is larger with optimal policy than with the optimized
simple instrument rule, the zero lower bond appears to have about the same impact on the trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and output—gap variance.13
13 The interest-rate variance can also be reduced by increasing the weight on interest-rate smoothing, λ∆i. However,
this deteriorates the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output-gap variance quite a bit (not shown) and is hence an
ineﬃcient way of reducing the inteterest-rate variance compared to increasing the weight on interest-rate variance, λi.
215. Conclusions
This paper has examined how the transmission of shocks depends on the conduct of monetary
policy. We have illustrated that policy with an estimated instrument rule or optimal policy can
generate quite diﬀerent impulse responses to some shocks, even if the response coeﬃcients and
loss-function parameters have been estimated from the same macroeconomic time series.
We have also shown that it matters which output-gap deﬁnition the central bank uses in its
loss function. Depending on whether it is the trend output gap (between output and trend output)
or the unconditional output gap (between output and unconditional ﬂexprice potential output,
the hypothetical output level that would prevail if prices and wages were entirely ﬂexible and had
been so forever) that is included in the loss function, the central bank faces diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
between stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. According to our analysis, the trade-oﬀ between
stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap is more favorable for the unconditional output gap than
for the commonly used trend output gap. However, abandoning the trend output gap in favor
of the unconditional or conditional output gap would also be associated with an increase in the
variance of output. However, abandoning the trend output gap in favor of the unconditional or
conditional output gap would also be associated with an increase in the variance of output since
conditional/unconditional potential output ﬂuctuates more than trend output due to the fact that
stationary but persistent technology shocks are important to explain business cycle ﬂuctuations in
the Swedish economy. On the other hand, because the trade-oﬀ between output-gap stabilization
and inﬂation stabilization is more favorable for unconditional and conditional output gaps than
for trend output gaps, abandoning the trend output gap for one of the other output gaps may be
associated with lower inﬂation variability.
The sensitivity of the results when imposing the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate
was also examined. While our approach to address the eﬀects of imposing the zero lower bound
is an approximation, the results suggest that this assumption has about the same implications for
the optimized simple instrument rule and the optimal policy.
22Appendix
A. The Ramses model
The model economy includes four diﬀerent categories of operating ﬁrms. These are domestic goods
ﬁrms, importing consumption, importing investment, and exporting ﬁrms, respectively. Within
each category there is a continuum of ﬁrms that each produces a diﬀerentiated good. The domestic
goods ﬁrms produce their goods using capital and labor inputs, and sell them to a retailer which
transforms the intermediate products into a homogenous ﬁnal good that in turn is sold to the
households.
The ﬁnal domestic good is a composite of a continuum of i diﬀerentiated goods, each supplied















t < ∞, (A.1)
where λd
t is a stochastic process that determines the time-varying ﬂexible-price markup in the














t is the output price of the ﬁnal good ﬁrm and Pd
it is its input price. The domestic
production is exposed to unit root technology growth. The production function for intermediate




it − ztφ, (A.3)
where zt is a unit-root technology shock capturing world productivity,  t is a domestic covariance
stationary technology shock, Kit the capital stock and Hit denotes homogeneous labor hired by the
ith ﬁrm. A ﬁxed cost ztφ is included in the production function. We set this parameter so that
proﬁts are zero in steady state.
We allow for working capital by assuming that a fraction ν of the intermediate ﬁrms’ wage
bill has to be ﬁnanced in advance through loans from a ﬁnancial intermediary. Cost minimization














t is the gross nominal rental rate per unit of capital, Rt−1 the gross nominal (economy
wide) interest rate, and Wt the nominal wage rate per unit of aggregate, homogeneous, labor Hit.
Each of the domestic goods ﬁrms is subject to price stickiness through an indexation variant
of the Calvo [8] model. Since we have a time-varying inﬂation target in the model we allow for
partial indexation to the current inﬂation target, but also to last period’s inﬂation rate in order to
allow for a lagged pricing term in the Phillips curve. Each intermediate ﬁrm faces in any period a
probability (1−ξd) that it can reoptimize its price. The reoptimized price is denoted P
d,new
t .14 The
diﬀerent ﬁrms maximize proﬁts taking into account that there might not be a chance to optimally



























where the ﬁrm is using the stochastic household discount factor (βξd)
s υt+s to make proﬁts condi-
tional upon utility.βis the discount factor, and υt+s the marginal utility of the households’ nominal
income in period t + s, which is exogenous to the intermediate ﬁrms. πd
t denotes inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
domestic sector, ¯ πc
t a (perceived) time-varying inﬂation target and MCd
it the nominal marginal cost.
The ﬁrst order condition of the proﬁt maximization problem in equation (A.5) yields the fol-
lowing log-linearized Phillips curve:
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b πd





























(1 − ξd)(1 − βξd)









where a hat denotes log-deviation from steady state (that is, ˆ Xt =l nXt − lnX).
We now turn to the import and export sectors. There is a continuum of importing consumption
and investment ﬁrms that each buys a homogenous good at price P∗
t in the world market, and
converts it into a diﬀerentiated good through a brand naming technology. The exporting ﬁrms
buy the (homogenous) domestic ﬁnal good at price Pd
t and turn this into a diﬀerentiated export
good through the same type of brand naming. The nominal marginal cost of the importing and
exporting ﬁrms are thus StP∗
t and Pd
t /St, respectively, where St is the nominal exchange rate
(domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). The diﬀerentiated import and export goods











t where κd is an indexation parameter.
24are subsequently aggregated by an import consumption, import investment and export packer,
respectively, so that the ﬁnal import consumption, import investment, and export good is each a













































where 1 ≤ λ
j
t < ∞ for j = {mc,mi,x} is the time-varying ﬂexible-price markup in the import
consumption (mc), import investment (mi)a n de x p o r t( x) sector. By assumption the continuum
of consumption and investment importers invoice in the domestic currency and exporters in the
foreign currency. In order to allow for short-run incomplete exchange rate pass-through to import
as well as export prices we therefore introduce nominal rigidities in the local currency price.15 This
is modeled through the same type of Calvo setup as above. The price setting problems of the
importing and exporting ﬁrms are completely analogous to that of the domestic ﬁrms in equation
(A.5), and the demand for the diﬀerentiated import and export goods follow similar expressions as
to equation (A.2). In total there are thus four speciﬁc Phillips curve relations determining inﬂation
in the domestic, import consumption, import investment and export sectors.
In the model economy there is also a continuum of households which attain utility from con-

























where Cjt, hjt and Qjt/Pd
t denote the jth household’s levels of aggregate consumption, labor supply
and real cash holdings, respectively. Consumption is subject to habit formation through bCj,t−1,
such that the household’s marginal utility of consumption is increasing in the quantity of goods
consumed last period. ζc
t and ζh
t are persistent preference shocks to consumption and labor supply,
respectively. To make cash balances in equation (A.8) stationary when the economy is growing
they are scaled by the unit root technology shock zt. Households consume a basket of domesti-
cally produced goods and imported products which are supplied by the domestic and importing
consumption ﬁrms, respectively. Aggregate consumption is assumed to be given by the following















15 There would be complete pass-through in the absence of nominal rigidities, since there are neither distribution
costs in the import and export sectors nor an endogenous pricing to market behavior among the ﬁrms in the model.
25where Cd
t and Cm
t are consumption of the domestic and imported good, respectively. ωc is the
share of imports in consumption, and ηc is the elasticity of substitution across consumption goods.
The households invest in a basket of domestic and imported investment goods to form the
capital stock, and decide how much capital to rent to the domestic ﬁrms given costs of adjusting
the investment rate. The households can increase their capital stock by investing in additional
physical capital (It), taking one period to come in action. The capital accumulation equation is
given by
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + Υt
³
1 − ˜ S (It/It−1)
´
It, (A.10)
where ˜ S (It/It−1) determines the investment adjustment costs through the estimated parameter
˜ S00,a n dΥt is a stationary investment-speciﬁc technology shock. Total investment is assumed to be


















where ωi is the share of imports in investment, and ηi is the elasticity of substitution across
investment goods.
Further, each household is a monopoly supplier of a diﬀerentiated labor service which implies
that they can set their own wage. After having set their wage, households supply the ﬁrms’ demand
for labor at the going wage rate. Each household sells its labor to a ﬁrm which transforms household
labor into a homogenous good that is demanded by each of the domestic goods producing ﬁrms.
Wage stickiness is introduced through the Calvo [8] setup, with partial indexation to last period’s
CPI inﬂation rate, the current inﬂation target and the technology growth. Household j reoptimizes
its nominal wage rate Wnew

































where ξw is the probability that a household is not allowed to reoptimize its wage, τ
y
t a labor income
tax, τw
t a pay-roll tax (paid for simplicity by the households), and μzt = zt/zt−1 is the growth rate
of the permanent technology level.16
The households can accumulate capital, save in domestic and foreign bonds, and also hold cash.
The choice between domestic and foreign bond holdings balances into an arbitrage condition pinning









j,t ,w h e r eκw is an indexation parameter.
26down expected exchange rate changes (that is, an uncovered interest parity condition). To ensure
aw e l l - d e ﬁned steady-state in the model, we assume that there is a premium on the foreign bond
holdings which depends on the aggregate net foreign asset position of the domestic households,
following, for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [17]. A common problem with open-economy
DSGE models is that they typically do not provide enough persistence to generate a hump-shaped
response of the real exchange rate after a shock to monetary policy, which is commonly found
in estimated VARs. A novel feature with our speciﬁcation of the risk premium is the inclusion
of the expected change in the exchange rate EtSt+1/St−1. This is based on the observation that
risk premia are strongly negatively correlated with the expected change in the exchange rate (that
is, the expected depreciation), see for instance Duarte and Stockman [11]. This pattern is often
referred to as the “forward premium puzzle”. The risk premium is given by:
Φ(at,S t, ˜ φt)=e x p
µ











where at ≡ (StB∗
t)/(Ptzt) is the net foreign asset position, and ˜ φt is a shock to the risk premium.
Consistent with the empirical evidence the idea here is that the domestic investors will require
a lower expected return on their foreign bond holdings relative to their domestic deposits if the
future exchange rate is easier to predict (that is, if the exchange rate is expected to depreciate
consecutively). However, this formulation is not structural in the sense that such a risk premium
can be associated with the utility function in (A.8). The UIP condition in its log-linearized form
is given by:
b Rt − b R∗
t =
³
1 − e φs
´
Et∆b St+1 − e φs∆b St − e φab at + b e φt, (A.14)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, and b Rt denotes the domestic nominal interest rate, and b R∗
t
the foreign nominal interest rate. By setting ˜ φs =0we obtain the UIP condition typically used
in small open-economy models. In the empirical analysis we formally test which speciﬁcation is
supported by the data.
Since Sweden went from a “ﬁxed” to a ﬂoating exchange rate/inﬂation targeting regime in
December 1992, we want to allow for a discrete break in the parameters in the instrument rule
(2.9) to account for a policy regime shift. It is not obvious, however, how one should model policy




θR2, if t ≥ 1993Q1
,
where θR1 captures the behavior of the central bank pre inﬂation targeting and θR2 captures the
behavior during the inﬂation targeting regime. ALLV [5] provides further discussion of why a
27Taylor-type instrument rule may provide a good approximation of the conduct of monetary policy
also before the adoption of an inﬂation target, when Sweden had a ﬁxed exchange rate.
The structural shock processes in the model is given in log-linearized form by the univariate
representation
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t, ˜ z∗
t} and j = {d,mc,mi,x}.
The government spends resources on consuming part of the domestic good, and collects taxes
from the households. The resulting ﬁscal surplus/deﬁcit plus the seigniorage are assumed to be
transferred back to the households in a lump sum fashion. Consequently, there is no government
debt. The ﬁscal policy variables - taxes on capital income, labor income, consumption, and the pay-
roll, together with (HP-detrended) government expenditures - are assumed to follow an identiﬁed
VAR model with two lags.
To simplify the analysis we adopt the assumption that the foreign prices, output (HP-detrended)
and interest rate are exogenously given by an identiﬁed VAR model with four lags. Both the foreign
and the ﬁscal VAR models are being estimated, using uninformative priors, ahead of estimating
the structural parameters in the DSGE model.17
To clear the ﬁnal goods market, the foreign bond market, and the loan market for working
capital, the following three constraints must hold in equilibrium:
Cd
t + Id
















νWtHt = μtMt − Qt, (A.17)
where Gt is government expenditures, Cx
t and Ix
t are the foreign demand for export goods which
follow CES aggregates with elasticity ηf,a n dμt = Mt+1/Mt is the monetary injection by the
central bank. When deﬁning the demand for export goods, we introduce a stationary asymmetric
(or foreign) technology shock ˜ z∗
t = z∗
t/zt,w h e r ez∗
t is the permanent technology level abroad, to
allow for temporary diﬀerences in permanent technological progress domestically and abroad.
17 The reason why we include foreign output HP-detrended and not in growth rates in the VAR is that the level of
foreign output enters the DSGE model (e.g., in the aggregate resource constraint). In the state-space representation
of the model, which links the theoretical model to the observed data, we subsequently add the unit-root world
productivity shock and the stationary asymmetric (or foreign) technology shock to the business cycle component
of foreign output in order to obtain the observed level of foreign GDP. This enables us to identify the stationary
asymmetric technology shock, since the process for detrended foreign output is identiﬁed from the VAR and the
process for the (unit root) world productivity is identiﬁed from this and the domestic quantities.
28B. Parameters
In table B.1 we report the parameters we have chosen to calibrate. These parameters are mostly
related to the steady-state values of the observed variables (that is, the great ratios: C/Y, I/Y
and G/Y ). Table A.2 shows the prior and posterior distributions obtained in ALLS [2].
Table B.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Calibrated value
β Households’ discount factor 0.999999
α Capital share in production 0.25
ηc Substitution elasticity between Cd
t and Cm
t 5
σa Capital utilization cost parameter 1,000,000
μ Money growth rate (quarterly rate) 1.010445
μz Technology growth rate (quarterly rate) 1.005455
σL Labor supply elasticity 1
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
λw Wage markup 1.30
ωi Share of imported investment goods 0.50
ωc Share of imported consumption goods 0.35
ν Share of wage bill ﬁnanced by loans 1
τy Labor income tax rate 0.30
τc Consumption tax rate 0.24
τk Capital income tax rate 0.00
ρ¯ π Inﬂation target persistence 0.975
gr Government expenditures-output ratio 0.30
29Table B.2: Prior and posterior distributions
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Policy rule Loss function Loss params.
type mean std.d. mode std.d. mode std.d. mode std.d.
/df Hess. Hess. Hess.
Calvo wages ξw beta 0.750 0.050 0.719 0.045 0.719 0.042
Calvo domestic prices ξd beta 0.750 0.050 0.712 0.039 0.737 0.043
Calvo import cons. prices ξm,c beta 0.750 0.050 0.868 0.018 0.859 0.016
Calvo import inv. prices ξm,i beta 0.750 0.050 0.933 0.010 0.929 0.011
Calvo export prices ξx beta 0.750 0.050 0.898 0.019 0.889 0.025
Indexation wages κw beta 0.500 0.150 0.445 0.124 0.422 0.115
Indexation prices κd beta 0.500 0.150 0.180 0.051 0.173 0.050
Markup domestic λf truncnormal 1.200 0.050 1.192 0.049 1.176 0.050
Markup imported cons. λm,c truncnormal 1.200 0.050 1.020 0.028 1.021 0.029
Markup.imported invest. λm,i truncnormal 1.200 0.050 1.137 0.051 1.154 0.049
Investment adj. cost ˜ S00 normal 7.694 1.500 7.951 1.295 7.684 1.261
Habit formation b beta 0.650 0.100 0.626 0.044 0.728 0.035
Subst. elasticity invest. ηi invgamma 1.500 4.0 1.239 0.031 1.238 0.030
Subst. elasticity foreign ηf invgamma 1.500 4.0 1.577 0.204 1.794 0.318
Risk premium ˜ φ invgamma 0.010 2.0 0.038 0.026 0.144 0.068
UIP modiﬁcation ˜ φs beta 0.500 0.15 0.493 0.067 0.488 0.029
Unit root tech. shock ρμz beta 0.750 0.100 0.790 0.065 0.765 0.072
Stationary tech. shock ρε beta 0.750 0.100 0.966 0.006 0.968 0.005
Invest. spec. tech shock ρΥ beta 0.750 0.100 0.750 0.077 0.719 0.067
Asymmetric tech. shock ρ˜ φ beta 0.750 0.100 0.852 0.059 0.885 0.041
Consumption pref. shock ρζc beta 0.750 0.100 0.919 0.034 0.881 0.038
Labour supply shock ρζh beta 0.750 0.100 0.382 0.082 0.282 0.064
Risk premium shock ρ˜ z∗ beta 0.750 0.100 0.722 0.052 0.736 0.058
Unit root tech. shock σμz invgamma 0.200 2.0 0.127 0.025 0.201 0.039
Stationary tech. shock σε invgamma 0.700 2.0 0.457 0.051 0.516 0.054
I n v e s t .s p e c .t e c h .s h o c k σΥ invgamma 0.200 2.0 0.441 0.069 0.470 0.065
Asymmetric tech. shock  ˜ z∗ invgamma 0.400 2.0 0.199 0.030 0.203 0.031
Consumption pref. shock σζc invgamma 0.200 2.0 0.177 0.035 0.192 0.031
Labour supply shock σζh invgamma 1.000 2.0 0.470 0.051 0.511 0.053
Risk premium shock σ˜ φ invgamma 0.050 2.0 0.454 0.157 0.519 0.067
Domestic markup shock σλd invgamma 1.000 2.0 0.656 0.064 0.667 0.068
Imp. cons. markup shock σλm,c invgamma 1.000 2.0 0.838 0.081 0.841 0.084
Imp. invest. markup shock σλm,i invgamma 1.000 2.0 1.604 0.159 1.661 0.169
Export markup shock σλx invgamma 1.000 2.0 0.753 0.115 0.695 0.122
Interest rate smoothing ρR,1 beta 0.800 0.050 0.912 0.019 0.900 0.023
Inﬂation response rπ,1 truncnormal 1.700 0.100 1.676 0.100 1.687 0.100
Diﬀ.i n ﬂ response r∆π,1 normal 0.300 0.100 0.210 0.052 0.208 0.053
Real exch. rate response rx,1 normal 0.000 0.050 −0.042 0.032 −0.053 0.036
Output response ry,1 normal 0.125 0.050 0.100 0.042 0.082 0.043
Diﬀ. output response r∆y,1 normal 0.063 0.050 0.125 0.043 0.133 0.042
Monetary policy shock σR,1 invgamma 0.150 2.0 0.465 0.108 0.647 0.198
Inﬂation target shock σ¯ πc,1 invgamma 0.050 2.0 0.372 0.061 0.360 0.059
Interest rate smoothing 2 ρR,2 beta 0.800 0.050 0.882 0.019
Inﬂation response 2 rπ,2 truncnormal 1.700 0.100 1.697 0.097
Diﬀ.i n ﬂ response 2 r∆π,2 normal 0.300 0.100 0.132 0.024
Real exch. rate response 2 rx,2 normal 0.000 0.050 −0.058 0.029
Output response 2 ry,2 normal 0.125 0.050 0.081 0.040
Diﬀ. output response 2 r∆y,2 normal 0.063 0.050 0.100 0.012
Monetary policy shock 2 σR,2 invgamma 0.150 2.0 0.135 0.029
Inﬂation target shock 2 σ¯ πc,2 invgamma 0.050 2.0 0.081 0.037
Output stabilization λy truncnormal 0.5 100.0 1.091 0.526 1.102 0.224
Interest rate smoothing λ∆i truncnormal 0.2 100.0 0.476 0.191 0.369 0.061
Log marg likelihood laplace −2631.56 −2654.45
30C. Unconditional variances
As shown in Svensson [19], the model solution satisﬁes
˜ Xt+1 = M ˜ Xt + ˜ Cεt+1, (C.1)

















(note that ˜ xt here does not denote the real exchange rate). The variance-covariance matrices of
the predetermined variables, Σ ˜ X ˜ X, and the forward-looking variables, Σ˜ x˜ x, therefore satisfy the
equations
Σ ˜ X ˜ X = MΣ ˜ X ˜ XM0 + ˜ CΣεε ˜ C0, (C.3)
Σ˜ x˜ x = FΣ ˜ X ˜ XF0, (C.4)
where Σεε is the variance-covariance matrix of the i.i.d. shocks εt.














˜ Xt ≡ ˜ D ˜ Xt,












˜ Xt + ηt ≡
=
D ˜ Xt + ηt.
Then their variance-covariance matrices, ΣYY and ΣZZ, can be determined from the variance-
covariance matrix of the predetermined variables,
ΣYY = ˜ DΣ ˜ X ˜ X ˜ D0, (C.5)
ΣZZ =
=
DΣ ˜ X ˜ X
=
D0 + Σηη, (C.6)
where Σηη is the variance-covariance matrix of the measurement errors ηt.
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